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In a number of papers,1 Paul Boghossian has argued against the compatibility between content 
externalism and self-knowledge by trying to show that, if externalism is correct, then there are 
possible situations in which a subject would be systematically wrong about the identity and 
difference of his thought contents. These possible situations involve the subject's being 
unwittingly switched between, say, Earth and Twin Earth. In this case, he would judge that two 
of his thoughts are of the same type when, on an externalist individuation, they are not. In 
Boghossian's terms, externalism is incompatible with transparency of mental content. This line 
of argument has received considerable attention and been the object of a wide and subtle 
discussion in recent times.2 
 In the present paper, however, Boghossian has turned to a different line of attack to 
compatibility between self-knowledge and externalism. He now tries to elaborate a reductio ad 
absurdum of compatibilism by trying to show that this position is committed to the claim that 
a subject can come to know, purely a priori, substantial truths about the world which every 
reasonable person would agree can only be known a posteriori. 
 There are some antecedents to this line of argument, as well as some criticisms to it, and 
I shall eventually refer to them while discussing this paper.3 
 According to Boghossian, Oscar, a compatibilist, is in a position to argue, purely a 
priori, as follows: 
                                                 
* Research for this paper has been funded by the Spanish Government DGICYT as part of the projects PB93-
1049-C03-02 and PB93-0683. My thanks to this institution for its generous help and encouragement. I also thank 
Josep Corbí and Tobies Grimaltos for comments on previous drafts. 
1 Especially in 'Content and Self-Knowledge', Philosophical Topics 17 (1989), pp. 5-26; 'Externalism and 
Inference', in E. Villanueva (ed.), Rationality in Epistemology, Philosophical Issues 2, Ridgeview Publishing 
Company, Atascadero (California), 1992, pp. 11-28; and 'The Transparency of Mental Content', Philosophical 
Perspectives 8 (1994), pp. 33-50. 
2 Participants in this discussion include Ted A. Warfield, 'Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism Are 
Compatible', Analysis 52 (1992), pp. 232-237 and 'Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds', Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 55 (1995), pp. 525-545; Stephen Schiffer, 'Boghossian on Externalism and 
Inference', in E. Villanueva (ed.), op. cit., pp. 29-37; K. Falvey and J. Owens, 'Externalism, Self-Knowledge and 
Skepticism', The Philosophical Review 103 (1994), pp. 107-137; J. Owens, 'Pierre and the Fundamental 
Assumption', Mind and Language 10 (1995), pp. 250-273; P. Ludlow, 'Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and the 
Prevalence of Slow Switching', Analysis 55 (1995), pp. 45-49; T. Burge, 'Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge', 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1996), pp. 91-116; C. Peacocke, 'Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. 
Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1996), 
pp. 117-158, among others. I myself have contributed a paper on this subject, 'Externalism and Self-Knowledge', 
to the VIII Inter-University Seminar on Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Granada, 23-25 May 
1996. 
3 See M. McKinsey, 'Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access', Analysis 51 (1991), pp. 9-16; A. Brueckner, 
'What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori', Analysis 52 (1992), pp. 111-118; M. McKinsey, 'Accepting the 
Consequences of Anti-Individualism', Analysis 54 (1994), pp. 124-128; A. Brueckner, 'The Characteristic Thesis 
of Anti-Individualism', Analysis 55 (1995), pp. 146-148; J. Brown, 'The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and 
Privileged Access', Analysis 55 (1995), pp. 149-156. See also note 7. 
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 1. If I have the concept water, then water exists. 
 2. I have the concept water. 
 Therefore, 
 3. Water exists. 
 
 Clearly, that water exists is something that cannot be known a priori. The form of the 
argument is valid. So, at least one of the premises will be either false or not knowable a priori. 
Boghossian, however, holds that Oscar is bound to accept that both premises are true and 
knowable a priori. Therefore, he is bound to accept that the existence of water can be known a 
priori. Since this is absurd and is implied by compatibilism, compatibilism must be false. 
 I would like to resist being forced to choose between externalism and self-knowledge. 
I think we can have both. I am, then, a compatibilist. My aim in this comment is going to be 
mainly negative: I will try to show that Boghossian's incompatibilist argument does not 
succeed. But I will also say something positive in defence of compatibilism, by giving some 
indications about how a plausible compatibilist externalism might be construed. 
 Premise 1 of Oscar's argument is based on the externalist thesis that there is a 
dependence relation between thought content and external individuation conditions. Premise 2 
rests on the assumption of self-knowledge. Though Boghossian takes this premise to be 
obviously acceptable, I find the way it is stated rather controversial. Normally, self-knowledge 
is held to extend to thought contents, rather than to the concepts one possesses in thinking those 
contents. In fact, it is hard to accept that one enjoys privileged access to the concepts one has, 
at least if this means the concepts one masters, in having a certain thought. Normal adults, I 
would say, know directly, non-inferentially, what they are currently thinking, in that they can 
give true reports of these thoughts, but I am pretty sure that they are quite often wrong about 
their mastery of the concepts that make up those thoughts. Burge's social externalism might 
have some bearing on this claim. So, if premise 2 is to be plausible, 'having a concept' has to 
be understood in a weak sense. One has a concept, in this weak sense, just in case one is able 
to have and to express, with a sufficient degree of competence, according to normal standards, 
thoughts involving the concept. So understood, premise 2 is certainly acceptable, given self-
knowledge. 
 Premise 2 and the antecedent of premise 1 in Boghossian's argument are stated under 
the assumption that the concept had by Oscar the compatibilist, namely the concept water, 
fulfills a number of conditions, related to presuppositions involved in Twin Earth experiments. 
First, water and twater (that is, any other substance macroscopically indistinguishable, but 
microscopically, chemically distinct from water) 'have to be thought of as distinct substances, 
distinct natural kinds'. Second, the word 'water' is intended by Oscar to express a natural kind 
concept. Third, Oscar has no views about the chemical composition of water. Fourth, Oscar's 
concept water is atomic, not compositional. Finally, the concept is to be thought of by Oscar 
as individuated in terms of its referent. If Oscar is to know premise 1 a priori, it is essential that 
these conditions are known by him a priori and that they, together with his possession of the 
concept, logically imply the consequent, namely that water exists. 
 Is a Twin Earth externalist committed to hold that premise 1 is true and knowable a 
priori? A natural and powerful response (which Boghossian considers and finally rejects) by 
an externalist would be to say that the second condition is too weak for this premise to be 
accepted. For imagine Peter, a compatibilist and a defender of the phlogiston theory. He intends 
his term 'phlogiston' to express a natural kind concept, as does Oscar with his term 'water'. 
Following Oscar's example, he reasons as follows: 
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 A. If I have the concept phlogiston, then phlogiston exists. 
 B. I have the concept phlogiston. 
 Therefore, 
 C. Phlogiston exists. 
 
An externalist will contend that what leads Peter to a false conclusion is that 'phlogiston' does 
not actually name a natural kind, so that the concept it expresses is not the concept of a natural 
kind. What is implied by externalism is not premise 1, but, at most, premise 1', which should 
replace the former: 
 
 1'. If I have the concept water and the concept water is the concept of a natural kind, 
then water exists. 
 
Now, however, conclusion 3 cannot be deduced from premises 1' and 2. Besides, and more 
importantly, the antecedent of 1' cannot be known a priori. Whether a term actually names a 
natural kind and so expresses the concept of a natural kind can only be known a posteriori. If 
this is correct, premise 1' becomes a triviality. Nothing substantial about the natural world can 
be obtained from externalism together with self-knowledge a priori. 
 Boghossian's strategy is to block this natural externalist move by denying that an 
externalist can allow for the existence of atomic concepts expressed by terms with an empty 
extension, such as 'phlogiston' in our world or 'water' on his extraordinary Dry Earth. On the 
other hand, taking such terms to express compound concepts makes questions about 
compositionality or atomicity of concepts depend on contingent external circumstances, such 
as the existence or non-existence of a natural kind, and this he deems unacceptable. 
Compositionality and atomicity are internal, non-relational properties of a concept; these 
properties supervene on the molecular and functional structure of the concept's possessor and 
are not contingent on what there can be in the outer world. If all this is correct, an externalist 
must concede that if a term expresses an atomic concept, then it has a non-empty extension. 
Now Boghossian is in a position to establish his reductio of compatibilism against objections. 
He can now reject premises of the form of our premise 1'. The antecedent of the conditional 
need not include that the concept Oscar has is the concept of a natural kind, which could only 
be known a posteriori. It suffices that Oscar intends to use it as a natural kind concept and that 
the concept is atomic (together with the rest of conditions stated above). And all this can be 
known by Oscar a priori. So, Oscar, the compatibilist, knows a priori that the concept he 
expresses with his term 'water' is the concept water and that this concept is atomic. So his term 
'water' has a non-empty extension. Since this term expresses the concept water, and he knows 
it does, he knows that the term's referent is the property of being water and that its extension is 
everything that has this property, namely all bits of water. He can conclude, then, purely a 
priori, that water exists o has existed at some time. But to think that this can be known a priori 
is absurd. Therefore, compatibilism is false. 
 Let me try to assess Boghossian's incompatibilist argument. A crucial question is the 
role that empirical information, e.g. that water is H2O, that water is a natural kind, or that the 
term 'water' names a natural kind, plays in externalism as a philosophical theory of meaning 
and content. This question is controversial, but is essential in discussing incompatibilist 
arguments. Once the role played by empirical information is rightly understood, it can be seen 
that no substantial truths about the external world can be obtained from externalism together 
with self-knowledge a priori. Externalism is the view that our thought contents, including our 
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concepts, are individuated, in part, by external conditions. But there are several possible ways 
of developing this basic insight. Twin Earth experiments are supposed to show that tokens of 
'water' do not mean the same on Earth as on Twin Earth. But why is this so? The most common 
answer is: because Earthians and Twin Earthians causally interact with different substances, 
water and twater respectively. This answer corresponds to a widely held version of externalism. 
'Causal externalism' might this version be called. This simple version faces, in my opinion, 
serious, maybe insurmountable difficulties.4 But it is not the only possible version. On the 
version I would favour, the answer to the above question would be: because Earthians and Twin 
Earthians learn and teach the meaning of 'water' in connection with samples of what are in fact 
different substances. On this version, our words' meaning depends on external conditions 
because certain bits of the external world are used to define those words, to give those words 
its meaning. If, in order to define 'water', I say to someone 'water is this', then the ostended bit 
itself gets into the meaning of the word and into the concept it expresses. This external bit 
becomes a norm for a correct use of the word. It is part of the structure of the concept this word 
expresses. This construal of externalism, inspired in some Wittgensteinian reflections,5 might 
be called 'normative externalism'. Normative externalism includes causal externalism, but not 
conversely. Normative externalism is not really far from Putnam's conception. Remarks about 
paradigmatic samples, with a clear Wittgensteinian flavour, can also be found in Putnam's "The 
meaning of 'meaning'". But these remarks are often forgotten in favour of cruder causal 
versions. On the normative construal, when I point to a sample of water to define the word 
'water', I need not know what its chemical composition is, nor do I need to be able to distinguish 
it from, say, twater if I were confronted with it. But the actual essence of the sample, whether 
we know it or not, helps giving the word its meaning, and this meaning is different from that it 
would be given to the word on Twin Earth. If this is on the right lines, it might reconcile 
Boghossian's view that compositionality and atomicity are internal to concepts with 
dependence of these properties on external conditions, as far as these conditions are an aspect 
of the concept itself. Let us see how. 
 On this construal of externalism, the real essence of a certain substance, which is only 
discoverable a posteriori, is given a constitutive role in individuating content and concepts. It 
is plausible to think that our present conviction that water is an atomic concept is not 
independent of the empirical discovery that water is a natural kind, namely H2O. Before this 
discovery, human beings might well be agnostic about atomicity or compositionality of their 
concept water. We would not say that the liquid on Twin Earth is not water if we did not know 
that water is H2O, and this is only knowable a posteriori. However, the constitutive relevance 
of this a posteriori information in determining our concept water and its difference from Twin 
Earthians' concept twater depends on our prior commitment to define terms like 'water' by 
means of external samples.6 It might be objected that our acceptance of the difference between 
the concepts water and twater shows that our concept water was atomic in the first place, prior 
                                                 
4 I do not know whether this causal version of externalism can meet Boghossian's objection of reductio we are 
dealing with. But I am pretty sure that it cannot meet objections based on 'switching cases', which I referred to in 
the first paragraph of this paper. It also faces the 'disjunction problem' that Fodor discovered in causal theories of 
meaning and content. 
5 See especially Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Remarks, Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, I, 6, and Philosophical 
Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1963, I, 50. Remarks about paradigmatic samples, with a clear Wittgensteinian 
flavour, can also be found in Putnam's 'The meaning of "meaning"'.  
6 This commitment might not be optional. Meaning might need, as a condition of its existence, such external, 
objective samples, at least is something like Wittgenstein's private language argument is accepted as cogent. The 
indispensability of external samples is a plausible way of reading this argument. 
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to the empirical discovery that water is a natural kind, so that atomicity does not really depend 
on a posteriori information. My answer would run as follows. For some concepts, such as water, 
gold, or tiger, we may hold an assumption that there is a hidden unitary essence lying behind 
the items that fall under the concept. But this assumption, which we may know a priori, is not 
enough to make those concepts atomic, for, on the normative version of externalism, the 
assumption is defeasible, in so far as we leave the last word about atomicity or compositionality 
of those concepts to the real nature of paradigmatic samples. Therefore, we do not have, a 
priori, a sufficient amount of data to decide the issue. In saying 'water is this', the ostended bit 
becomes an aspect of the concept, so that, if we discover that no common unitary essence 
underlies the different samples, we cancel the atomicity assumption, and compositional aspects 
become decisive. If atomicity of such concepts as water was settled in advance, then, were we 
to discover that there is no common essence to water, we would say 'so, there is no water' or 
'water does not exist'; but we would not say this; what we would say, instead, is that water was, 
in fact, a collection of different substances. Counterfactuals such as 'if there were no H2O in 
our environment, our term "water" would express a different concept from the one it now 
expresses' rest, I contend, on our decision to understand by 'water' this, where the ostended bit 
is a sample. In this frame, the empirical discovery that paradigmatic samples of water are H2O 
confirm the (defeasible) assumption that water is an atomic concept. If this is correct, we cannot 
know a priori that the concept water is atomic. Therefore, an externalist cannot conclude, purely 
a priori, that water exists. He might conclude that, since he has the concept water, there have 
to be external possibility conditions for that concept, but this transcendental reasoning to the 
effect that there are some external conditions or other, controversial as it may be, is not absurd.7 
If all this is correct, an externalist may plausibly hold that tokens of the same word-type can 
express an atomic concept in one world and a compositional concept in another, even if their 
inhabitants are molecular and functional duplicates. Thereby, he can vindicate premise 1' and 
avoid reductio. 
 Suppose, however, that Boghossian is right and that atomicity or compositionality of 
concepts supervenes on molecular and functional structure of their possessors, independently 
of what there is in the outer world. If so, the concept expressed by 'water' on Dry Earth would 
be atomic. Could an externalist accept, against Boghossian's contention, that a term with an 
empty extension expresses nonetheless an atomic concept? I think he could.8 What are the truth 
conditions of 'water is wet' on Dry Earth? We can start with the following statement: 
 
 'Water is wet' is true on Dry Earth if, and only if, Dry Earth's water  is wet. 
 
But 'Dry Earth's water' has no referent. Before this, an externalist could opt, couldn't he, for 
saying that the right part of the biconditional is false or for saying that it has no truth value. 
Only in this latter case might he be forced to say that 'water is wet' has no meaning on Dry 
Earth. If he opts for saying that lack of reference of a component makes the sentence false, he 
can say that 'water is wet' is false on Dry Earth, but has meaning. But then, in what conditions 
would it be true? Well, it would be true if there were in fact a substance, a natural kind, in the 
extension of 'water' and this substance were wet. Why an externalist may not say this? He could 
then say what is the concept expressed by tokens of 'water' on Dry Earth: it is the concept Dry 
Earthians would have if there were in fact a natural kind, with the right external appearance, 
                                                 
7 This is something that Brueckner points out against McKinsey's incompatibilism. See note 3. 
8 I have been led to think of this by Peter Carruthers' treatment of empty demonstrative thoughts in his article 
'Russellian Thoughts', Mind 96 (1987), pp. 18-35. 
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denoted there by tokens of 'water'. It must be conceded, however, that in order to be more 
precise about the concept an externalist should know what natural kind would be denoted. But 
the above description of the concept seems precise enough to counter Boghossian's claim that 
an externalist cannot allow for atomic concepts in empty cases. If all this works, it could again 
support premise 1' in Oscar's argument, which, to recall, included in the antecedent the 
condition that the concept had by Oscar has to be the concept of a natural kind, instead of just 
being intended by him to be so. 
 These possible replies to Boghossian's incompatibilist argument may not be 
compossible. But if at least one of them is successful, this would suffice for compatibilists to 
elude reductio. 
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